









SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
 





The Information Content of Directors’ Trades: 






















The working papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. Please do not quote 
without obtaining the author’s consent as these works are in their draft form. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily endorsed by the School. 
 The Information Content of Directors’ Trades: 














♣  and Harminder Singh
•  
                                                 
This is an ongoing work. Please do not quote without consulting the corresponding author. We would like to thank Mohamed Ariff, Bill 
Dimovski and Chee Jin Yap for their insightful comments that improved the presentation of this paper. 
♦Settlements Officer, Esanda Finance, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, Email: lhot@deakin.edu.au
 
♣ Associate Lecturer, School of Accounting Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Australia, Email: 
navjot@deakin.edu.au
 
• Corresponding Author: Lecturer, School of Accounting Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Australia. Phone No: 61-3-
92446233. Email: singh@deakin.edu.au. 
  1The Information Content of Directors’ Trades: 





We examine the trading activities of directors in shares of their own companies on the 
Australian Stock Exchange during the July-December 2005 period. We find that 
directors of small companies in particular earn abnormal return after both their 
‘Purchase’ and as well as their ‘Sale’ trade. Directors of these companies have an 
uncanny ability to time the market by trading when mispricing is greatest, and are 
able to predict the future performance of their firms in short run. For directors of 
medium and large companies, we find evidence that ‘Sale’ trades are the ones which 
work as loss avoiders. Outsiders recognise to some extent that directors’ trades are 
informative, however they are slow to incorporate the new information into prices, 
refuting much of the market efficiency literature.  
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The Information Content of Directors’ Trades: 







Insider trading has been regulated in Australia under various Securities Industry Acts 
since 1970 and is an offence in the majority of the world’s capital markets.  Whilst 
insider trading typically has a negative connotation associated with it, this study does 
not attempt to give credence to whether insider trading is harmful, nor whether it should 
or should not be regulated. Rather, the purpose is much simpler. We examine whether 
insider trading is prevalent in the market, given the current regulatory structure in which 
it is prohibited. Thus, there are important public policy implications. It may indicate 
whether directors appear to blatantly disregard the law and whether the current 
regulatory structure is effective. 
Well-known economist and Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman (2003) aptly 
described this argument in his statement "You want more insider trading, not less. You 
want to give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the 
company an incentive to make the public aware of that”. According to this reasoning, 
corporate collapses such as HIH and Enron would have been brought to the public’s 
attention much sooner. 
Manne (1966) argues that allowing insider trading is an effective means of 
compensating corporate agents for innovations. The entrepreneur can purchase the 
firm’s shares before the innovation is announced to the market and sell the shares after 
the resultant price increase. This forms an effective compensation scheme whereby the 
compensation is directly linked to the value of the innovation to the firm. Carlton and 
Fischel (1983) cite that this method is more effective than constant renegotiation of 
fixed contracts and allows the individual to tailor the compensation to the information 
he or she produces. As a result, this further increases the entrepreneur’s incentive to 
  3develop more valuable innovations. Society and the firm benefit through the additional 
information produced that is of value to the firm.  
Numerous studies in the US have examined corporate insider trading, primarily because 
of the availability of data. Despite the extensive data pertaining to the US, a number of 
questions remain unresolved. Additionally, insider trading literature in regards to 
Australia is scarce because of its slow adoption of disclosure requirements and thus 
there is an apparent lack of data needed to conduct research. Although data are now 
available, the literature is still scanty. This provides the basis for our research, 
especially considering that directors are likely to be in possession of the most inside 
information. 
We attempt to contribute to the some unresolved issues and to the lack of empirical 
research pertaining to Australia. We use directors’ trading as a proxy for corporate 
insider information. Directors as corporate insiders have an intimate knowledge of the 
workings of a firm and have timely access to financial performance figures. 
Considering this as a back drop their predictability of the company’s performance and 
the stock market response appears to be better at least in short term.  
If directors’ trades do contain information, then according to the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, when the trade becomes public knowledge, this should be reflected 
in the share price. Outsiders should not be able to make abnormal profits from trading 
on this information. Seyhun (1986), and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) found results 
consistent with the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Net of transaction costs, 
outsiders do not benefit from imitating directors.  
 
More recently, however, and using a sample of trades with a relatively shorter delay 
between trade and disclosure, Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) found that both 
insiders and outsiders can earn abnormal profits, net of transaction costs in the short 
and long-term. This study has important market efficiency implications. If, as 
suggested, investors are able to earn abnormal profits from publicly available 
information, the market is not semi-strong form efficient. 
 
Lorie and Neiderhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1976) and Finnerty (1976),  among others, all 
adopt an intensive trading criterion and conclude that insiders in the U.S. do earn 
  4significant abnormal returns by trading on the securities of their own firms. Jaffe 
(1976 p.428.), in particular, asserts that the occurrence of profitable insider 
transactions implies that “trading on inside information is widespread” and “insiders 
actually do violate security regulations”.  
 
Whilst these studies generally indicate that insiders do profit from trading when in 
possession of non-public information, the studies do not attempt to identify who 




2. Literature Review 
 
Finnerty (1976) has found that insiders earn above average returns when they buy 
securities of their respective organizations. On the sell side, his results indicated that the 
securities the insiders were selling fell more than the general market decline of the same 
period. From his study, it is apparent that in the short-run insiders are able to identify 
profitable as well as loss avoidable situations in their own companies. 
Rogoff (1964) examined 45 companies in which, within a single month, three or more 
insiders buy their company’s stock and no insiders sell the stock. He found that the 
returns to the insiders of these companies in the following 6 months were on average 
9.5% higher than the return to the stock market as a whole. 
Jaffe (1974) tested the information content of the ‘Official Summary of Security 
Transactions and Holdings’ of U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission. He has 
found that insiders do possess special information. However, after adjustment for 
transaction cost, only the intensive trading samples with 8-month holding periods were 
earning statistically large returns. 
King and Roell (1988) found that a buy portfolio replicating 109 insider purchases 
produced an abnormal return of 2.47% after one month, and 53% after twelve months. 
The sell portfolio of 269 insider sales produced a 1.18% and 7.6% abnormal return 
respectively. Gregory et al (1994) documented abnormal returns following insiders’ 
  5trades. They further showed that a large proportion of these abnormal returns occurred 
in small and medium sized firms.  
Cheuk, Fan and So (2006) examined the characteristics and price movements of legal 
insider transactions in Hong Kong. As per their findings, Hong Kong insiders can make 
abnormal profits from both buying and selling activities. The magnitude of these 
abnormal profits associated with insider sales is considerably larger than that associated 
with insider purchases.  
In an another study, Hillier and Marshall (2002) examined the abnormal share price 
returns of director trading, and report that on average directors outperformed the market 
and seemed to time their trade perfectly. Further, there was evidence that after above 
average performance, directors sold their shares in unison. 
Pope et al (1990) using a slightly larger sample of 275 buy and 289 sell signals over the 
period 1977-84 found that for up to six months after the signal there were significant 
abnormal returns of 4.85% for the whole sample. When split into buy and sell signals, 
the sells were significantly negative, but the buys, though positive were not significant.  
Some of the studies on insider trading has undertaken on the basis of private 
information. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) provide evidence of excess returns earned 
prior to the first public disclosure of merger announcements. They cite that systematic 
abnormal returns can be interpreted as prima facie evidence of the market’s reaction 
to information in advance of its public announcement. Similar findings have been 
observed in the lead up to dividend announcements (John and Lang, 1991), share 
repurchases (Lee, Mikkelson et al., 1992), earnings announcements (Park, Jang et al., 
1995), and takeovers (Meulbroek, 1992). Agarwal and Singh (2006) tested the insider 
trading prior to merger announcement in a developing economy, i.e. India and found 
existence of possible insider trading prior to merger announcements. 
 
Tomasic (1991) interviewed key players of Australia in the finance industry including 
brokers, lawyers, merchant bankers, financial journalists, and officers, among others, 
who offered their perceptions of the incidence of insider trading. He found that insider 
trading occurs predominantly in small speculative stocks and is likely to be 
undertaken by directors. He also contends that illegal insider trading is likely to occur 
  6in the market for shares rather than options.
1 Brown and Foo (1997) and Anand, 
Brown and Watson (2002) find that directors’ selling transactions, not purchase 
transactions, are associated with abnormal returns.  
 
We extend on Brown and Foo’s (1997) research by examining the share price 
performance of companies surrounding registered directors’ trades. If directors trade on 
the basis of information, which they and only they have and earn abnormal return in a 
relatively short span it is likely that their trades contain information. Thus, the general 
investors have a strong incentive to mimic the trading patterns of directors. 
With this in mind, the primary aim of this study is to answer the following questions: 
1.  Do directors earn abnormal returns from trades in their own companies? 
2.  Can investors mimic directors’ trades and earn abnormal returns? 
 
Importantly, our research is not only a test of insider trading, but also of market 
efficiency. Evidence of the ability to earn superior returns based on recorded corporate 
insider trades has implications for the efficiency of securities markets.  A market is 
efficient depending on the information set which is incorporated into prices. If directors 
are able to earn abnormal returns on the basis of private information it means market is 
not strong form efficient, or if outsiders are able to earn abnormal returns from 
portfolios constructed on the basis of the trading behaviour of directors, this would 
indicate that the market is not semi-strong efficient. It is appropriate to determine the 
state of efficiency in regards to the Australian market, which, is nevertheless a by-





                                                 
1 This result is not surprising considering the Australian options market was not particularly liquid in 1991. 
  73. Data 
Information on directors’ trades was obtained from the original Appendix 3Y 
database compiled by DatAnalysis. As required by the Corporations Law, directors 
must disclose any changes in their interests of the company to the ASX within five 
business days
2. Directors fulfil this requirement by completing an Appendix 3Y, 
which is then submitted to the ASX.  After the information has been disclosed to the 
ASX, the full text of the announcement is made publicly available
3. 
Data was collected for all changes in directors’ holdings reported to the ASX during 
the six-months from July to December 2005. Information was obtained from the 
original disclosure notices regarding the type of trade, volume of the transaction, 
nature of the interest, date of the transaction, and the date of disclosure.  
 
Transactions were removed from the sample if (i) more than one transaction type was 
stated in the change of director’s interest notice, but the number of shares was 
indistinguishable between the two types, (ii) the trade involved an amendment in 
subsequent disclosures and (iii) the trade specifically disclosed the reason for the 
change in holdings. In cases where no date of change was reported, the date of change 
was taken to be the date of disclosure. Trades that extended over a period of time but 
were not disclosed separately were recorded as at the date of the first transaction. 
 
To avoid double counting, where two or more trades by different directors involved 
the same parcel of indirectly held shares, all but one of the transactions were removed 
from the sample. That is, where two or more directors of the same company reported 
a change in holdings of the same amount on the same day, the nature of the interests 
was examined. If the nature of the interest was indirect for both directors, only one of 
the transactions was retained. Similarly, multiple trades on the same day by the same 
director of the same company were combined together to form a total change in 
holdings. 
 
                                                 
2  (Gettler 2005) commercial research finds notification breaches by 62% of the largest 200 listed companies. 
3 The trade of directors of all the companies listed on ASX are even published by The Age newspaper on every weekend. 
 
  8Given that not all directors’ trades are based on inside information, only on market 
transactions were included in the sample. Therefore, following types of trades; off 
market trades, dividend reinvestment schemes, conversions of options, share purchase 
plans and rights issues were removed from the sample. Likewise, to reduce the 
potential for including trades for reasons such as diversification or taxation, an 
intensive trading criterion was imposed. If a company’s stock exhibits intensive 
trading in the same direction by directors, it is likely that the trades are information 
motivated. In order to be included, it was required that over the given sample period, 
four or more directors buy (sell) shares and no director takes an opposing action
4.  
This requirement is consistent with previous empirical research conducted by Lorie 
and Neiderhoffer (1968) and Jaffe (1976). 
 
A survivorship criterion was imposed to only include companies that had available 
share price and volume data for the 160 days before and after the date of trade. 
Companies were also removed from the sample if they were suspended from trading 
at any time during the sample period. This was determined by examining the volume 
and price data for each firm. If a company experienced an unusual period of zero 
returns and volume their company announcements were examined to determine if this 
was due to a trading halt.
5 No adjustments have been made to account for thin trading 
and thus it may be a problem affecting many of the companies, especially in the case 
of smaller sub sample. 
                                                 
4 The intensive trading criteria could have been over a shorter period, such as one month, however, Lakonsihok and Lee 
(2001) note that measures calculated over longer time horizons seem to have a somewhat greater predictive power. A 
shorter time period would result in many firms having no trades.  
5 Although care has been taken to remove companies that were suspended from trading during the period, because of the 
subjective nature of this measure, some companies that were suspended may still remain in the sample.  
  9Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
Number of trades 472 63 318 22 98 28 56 13
Number of firms 82 12 55 4 19 5 8 3
Mean** 41,801 191,582 49,369 216,058 36,659 127,341 1,876 46,693
Minimum 50 730 50 4,000 275 730 71 1,000
Maximum 6,149,327 10,000,000 3,746,734 6,099,391 2,370,000 10,000,000 6,149,327 5,781,000
Mean** 150,059 951,965 53,845 77,261 50,764 927,415 20,406 1,697,506
Minimum 38 1,480 38 1,480 1,400 2,000 2,304 10,060
Maximum 16,500,000 27,600,000 16,500,000 682,400 5,192,000 27,600,000 12,544,627 21,794,370
*** Number of shares traded multiplied by closing daily share price
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: Directors' trades of intensive trading firms
Period: July - December 2005
All trades Small  Medium Large
Breakdown by Company Size*
Panel B. Directors' trades by trade size
Panel C. Directors' trades by value ($)***
Panel A. Total trades
** Outliers were removed from the sample for the purpose of calculating the average trade.
* Large companies are defined as Top 150 companies according to market capitalisation as of 28 September 2006. Medium companies are 
Top 500 companies excluding those in the Top 150; and Small companies are those outside the Top 500.
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4.1 Abnormal Return 
The stock price behaviour surrounding directors’ trades was examined using an event 
study method where the date of interest was the date of director’s trade. To avoid 
misspecification arising from overlapping event periods, the sample was further 
reduced. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) cite the only way to overcome this problem is 
to purge the observations of overlapping returns. Thus, of the companies that 
experienced intensive trading, only one trade was selected in order to calculate 
profitability of possible insider trading. Selection was based on the trade of greatest 
volume and the date of change, so as to capture the date of the other trades in the 
surrounding event window. 
There is difficulty involved in detecting insider trading, both in the market place and 
by individual directors. Thus, the presence of insider trading may be inferred from the 
existence of abnormal returns – a practice that is generally accepted in the finance 
literature (Keown and Pinkerton 1981). The calculation of abnormal returns requires 
the use of a benchmark in order to isolate the unusual performance of a specific asset 
by comparing the expected returns with actual returns.  
1 For each of the securities, daily rates of return were calculated:
Where; 
) ln( ) ln( 1 , , , − − = t i t i t i  P P R  ……..(1)   
= return of security i on day t  Ri,t 
Pi,t and P are the adjusted closing price for security i on day t and t-1 respectively.  i,t-1 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) indicate that firm size affects the abnormal returns from 
insider trading and must be considered when selecting an appropriate model. Dimson 
and Marsh (1986) propose that the size effect can be overcome by constructing a set 
of diversified control portfolios for companies in different capitalisation classes. This 
method is preferable to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or a market model 
because it specifically accounts for firm size and is non-parametric in its approach. 
The use of this method is also consistent with Lin and Howe (1990).   
t Di t i t i R R AR , , , = − …….. (2) 
Where: 
                                                 
 We concentrate on daily rates of return rather than monthly because it facilitates a closer scrutiny of the impact of insider 
trading. 
1 
AR  = abnormal return of stock i on day t  t i,
R   = price relative of stock i on day t  t i,
RD   = price relative of equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the same size decile 
D as stock i on day t 
t i,
All companies listed on the ASX were ranked according to market capitalisation as at 
28 September 2006
2 and divided into three separate control portfolios according to 
size: small, medium and large. Large companies were defined as Top 150 companies 
according to their market capitalisation; Medium companies are Top 500 companies 
excluding those in the Top 150; and Small companies are those outside the Top 500. 
Daily returns for each portfolio were calculated by averaging the daily returns of the 
securities in the portfolio. The control portfolios include the sample firms, an 
approach consistent with a “naïve” investor. The control portfolio reflects the buy and 
hold return that a naïve investor could have earned simply by investing in a well-
diversified portfolio of stocks, of similar size, without any special information. 
Average abnormal returns were calculated cross-sectionally up to 160 days before and 
after the date of trade:














AAR t = Average Abnormal Return on day t 
The average abnormal returns were then cumulated over several event windows to 
form the cumulated average abnormal returns (CAR) for the purchases and sales sub 






2 1 ) , (
t
t t
t t t AAR CAR ……….. (4) 
Where; 
                                                 
 Historical market capitalisation data was unavailable for the event period windows.  2
 Pre-trade returns were examined because they can give significant insight into the reasons why directors trade and their 
ability to time the market.  
3) , ( 2 1 t t CAR =Cumulative Average Abnormal Return over the period t1 to t2 
 
4.2 Abnormal Volume 
In the market microstructure literature, high trading volumes are associated with the 
release and reception of information. Abnormal volume was calculated in a similar 
way to abnormal return and requires the use of a benchmark. Gao and Oler (2004) 
propose a method of calculating abnormal volume that accounts for firm specific 






Vi,t   = Volume of company i on day t 
Vi, normal = Average daily volume for firm i over estimation period 
VD,t  = Average volume of equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the  same size 
     decile D as stock i on day t 
VD, normal = Average volume of equally weighted portfolio of stocks in same decile as 
       stock i over the estimation period 
Average abnormal volume was calculated cross-sectionally for the 160 days before 




AAVt  = Cross-sectional Average Abnormal Volume at time t 
AVi,t   = Abnormal Volume of company i on day t 
The cross-sectional average abnormal volume (AAV) was calculated for the 
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normal i




















AAVt5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Abnormal Return 
5.1.1 Timing of Directors’ Trades 
Stock price behaviour surrounding directors’ trades is displayed for both purchases 
and sales in Figure 1 for the 160 days before and after the date of trade. From this, it 
can be seen that not only do directors earn abnormal returns from their trades, but also 
on average time their trades nearly to perfection. The graph exhibits a price reversal 
effect; sales occur after a period of good performance and purchases occur after a 
period of poor performance, at which time the trend is reversed. From approximately 
80 days before through to the day of the transaction, abnormal returns on purchases of 
directors’ firms on average under perform the constructed portfolio. On the day of the 
buy transaction the abnormal returns on shares of the directors’ companies begin to 
move upwards. Can we say that directors have an idea before hand that prices are 
going to go north? Basel and Stein (1979) has given reason that purchases are more 
often driven by information or profit motive. It seems it is not so easy to establish. 
Sale transactions generally exhibit the opposite pattern.  









































         
Table  2. 
160 days Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
    Breakdown by Company Size 
        
Event Period CAR  All  Small  Medium  Large 
        
Panel A: CAR of Purchase Trades for 160 days before and after event 
[-160:0] -0.072**  0.004  -0.306**  -0.0381** 
[+1:+160] 0.125*  0.1788**  0.0406*  -0.0386* 
        
Panel B: CAR of Sales Trades for 160 days before and after event 
[-160:0] 0.1808***  0.2323***  0.1185***  0.2156** 
[+1:+160] -0.1020**  -0.064  -0.0882***  -0.1755** 
        
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
        
          
Whilst the results for all trades appear to be straightforward, when stratified according 
to size and can be seen in Figures 2 to 4. Medium, small and large companies all 
exhibit a price reversal effect for sales, where it is apparent that directors time their 
trades and earn substantial abnormal returns, with varying degrees of profitability.  
 
   
160 day Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns


































































Purchases on the other hand, for all firms, do not generally exhibit a price reversal 
effect; however they do still on average exhibit patterns consistent with directors 
timing their trades. Pre-event abnormal returns of purchases by directors of small 
companies fluctuate around zero. Post-event abnormal returns show a positive trend, 
however, starting around the day of the director’s trade. Pre-event abnormal returns  
  
 
160 day Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns
















































are not necessary in illustrating the timing ability of the directors (Mitchell and 
Watson, 2004). Similarly, directors’ trades of medium companies do not exhibit a 
price reversal effect. Like in sales, pre-trade abnormal returns are negative; however, 
the post-trade abnormal returns are approximately zero for the following 150 days. 
Whilst directors’ purchases are not profitable, they are timed to avoid significant 
losses. Purchases by directors of large companies do not show any apparent trend. 
Abnormal returns are approximately the same over the pre- and post-trade periods. 





igure 2160 day Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns -Trades by 
Directors of Small Companies 
160 day Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns











5.1.2 Profitability in 160day Pre- and Post-trade Period 
Directors may earn abnormal returns if stock prices rise abnormally after their 
purchase trades or if stock prices decline abnormally after their sales. Negative post-
trade profits of directors’ sales are taken to be profits to directors in the sense that 



































FIGURE 4.When all trades are combined, in table-2, purchases (12.56%) are more profitable than 
sales (10.20%) over the 160 days after the trade date. This finding is consistent with 
previous literature in the US and the UK. Interestingly, it contradicts the previous 
empirical research conducted in Australia. Again, this finding is inconsistent when 
stratified by company size. Purchases (17.88%) by directors of small companies are 
significantly more profitable than sales (6.41%). Trades by large and medium 
companies have the opposite effect. Sales (17.55%) by directors of large companies 
are more profitable than purchases (-3.86%), as are trades by directors of medium 
companies (8.82% and 4.06% for sales and purchases respectively). The finding of 
post-trade abnormal returns is in accord with the results of previous studies (based on 
different samples). For example, Givoly and Palmon (1985) report cumulative 
abnormal returns of approximately 8.6% for purchases and 11.53% for sales over the 
240 days after the trade. They estimate abnormal returns for an eight-month holding 
period of approximately 8% (an average of reported results for sell and buy 
transactions). 
 
Although trades by directors of small companies are consistently profitable, there is 
little evidence that profitability is inversely related to firm size. The substantial 
profitability of sales transactions by directors of large companies indicates that large 
companies are not necessarily more efficiently priced or face greater scrutiny than 
their small company counterparts. Abnormal return in 160 days window might have 
been affected by other micro or macro issues, it’s why we have looked into a 
relatively smaller window. 
 
5.1.3 Profitability in 90 day Pre- and Post-trade Period 
Similar findings can be observed in Figure 5 over the 90-day period before and after 
the date of the director’s trade. Similar to the 160-day findings, sales exhibit a price 
reversal, as do purchases, except for trades by directors of large companies. The 
profitability of trades over this shorter horizon, as shown in Table 3, allow us to 
provide further insight into the trading patterns of directors and their possible holding 
periods.  
 














































90 days Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
    Breakdown by Company Size 
        
Event Period CAR  All  Small  Medium  Large 
        
Panel A: CAR of Purchase Trades for 90 days before and after 
event 
[-90:0] -0.0650**  -0.004  -0.2636**  -0.011 
[+1:+90] 0.088**  0.1393**  -0.0067  -0.0715*** 
        
Panel B: CAR of Sales Trades for 90 days before and after event 
 
[-90:0] 0.1416**  0.1139  0.1220***  -0.2112*** 
[+1:+90] -0.1197***  -0.1457*  -0.1125***  -0.097 
       
       
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
       
Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Panel A of Table 3 indicates that the majority of abnormal returns are earned closer to 
the trade date and that during the 90-day to 160-day period abnormal returns are not 
as high as in post 90 day window as far as trade of all companies is concerned. It 
appears that private information is evident in the market up to 90 days before the 
actual date of the directors’ trades, but not over a longer horizon. Over the post-trade 
period for purchases the abnormal returns are only slightly larger over the longer time 
period, except for trades made by directors of large companies. Price reversals are very strong in the 90 day window. Directors of medium and large companies are 
likely to have holding periods of at least 160days. On the sales side, again, price 
reversals are very strong. Except that of large companies, loss avoiding is of greater 
magnitude. Directors of small companies are in beneficial situation in both types of 
trades. Lakonishik and Lee (2001) highlighted that this segment of the market is often 
perceived to be less efficient. Sales trades’ results indicate that bad news is 
incorporated into prices much sooner than good news. 
 
5.1.4 Profitability in Short-Term 
Directors’ trades have little explanatory power in predicting returns over a short 
horizon such as one month, suggesting that directors are not likely to be day traders or 
fly by night operators. Profitability of purchase trades in the short term i.e. over the 
following twenty days; do not appear to be statistically significant for any trades, 
except of medium companies, which have a cumulative abnormal return of 2.95% as 
shown in Table 4.  CAR is (4.16) in the case of large companies in post 20 days 
window, which represent the loss avoiding trades. Post 20 days sales trades are 
exception for the small sub sample. 
Table 4. 
20 days Pre- and Post-trade Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
    Breakdown by Company Size 
        
Event Period CAR  All  Small  Medium  Large 
       
Panel A: CAR of Purchase Trades for 20 days before and after 
event 
[-20:-1] -0.003  0.007  -0.0376*  0.0131* 
[0:+20] 0.006  0.001  0.0295**  -0.008 
       
Panel B: CAR of Sales Trades for 20 days before and after event 
[-20:-1] 0.037  0.092  0.0333*  -0.0290* 
[0:+20] 0.0301**  0.1466***  -0.020  -0.0416* 
        
        
* signifcant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
The finding that directors’ trades are profitable in the long run but not over a short 
horizon is again consistent with studies conducted in the United States [Givoly and 
Palmon (1985) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)]. It is important to note that trading 
regulations differ between the two countries. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States prohibits insiders from profiting on round-trip 
trades completed within a six-month period. Any profits made from such a transaction 
must be disgorged and returned to the corporation
4. No such regulation exists in 
Australia. One possible reason for this observation could be that directors are still 
wary about their legal obligations. If they were to trade based on a forthcoming event, 
this may subject them to unwanted scrutiny by ASIC. The presence of abnormal 
returns over a relatively longer time horizon and not over the short term also suggests 
that directors are not enticed to trade based on the forthcoming disclosure of a specific 
event (Givoly and Palmon, 1985).  
 
Overall, only purchases by directors of small companies show any significant 
abnormal return. Sales, on the other hand are profitable by directors of all companies. 
Whilst purchases by directors of medium companies are not profitable, they are timed 
to avoid significant negative abnormal returns and could be an indication that the 
period of poor performance has ended.   
 
5.1.5 Mimicking Trades by Outsiders 
Given that directors do generally earn abnormal returns and time their trades, their 
trading contains a certain degree of information regarding the future long-term 
performance of the firm. Therefore, it would be expected that when the director 
discloses the change in their interest, this would be fully incorporated into share prices 
on the day of disclosure. So, as per semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, outsiders 
should not be able to mimic the trading patterns and earn any abnormal returns on this 
publicly available information. Specifically examining the abnormal returns earned in 
the post-disclosure period has tested this, the results of which can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5. Post-disclosure Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
Breakdown by Company Size     
       
Event Period CAR  All  Small  Medium  Large 
        
Panel A. Purchases 
[+5:+90] 0.0777**  0.1236** 0.007  -0.0695** 
[+5:+160] 0.115  0.163  0.041  -0.037 
        
Panel B. Sales* 
                                                 
 s16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934  4[+5:+90] 0.1317*** 0.1826** 0.1187*** 0.086 
[+5:+160] 0.1140**  0.101  0.0944*** 0.1640** 
   
*Returns for directors' sales are converted to a "loss avoided" interpretation by 
multiplying them by -1. 
        
        
It is apparent that in purchase trades, except of directors of small companies none 
other has much abnormal return in a period up to 90 days. The information contained 
in directors’ trades should be reflected in the share price up to five trading days after 
the change in holdings, as required by law. Not all directors disclose their trades 
within this time period.
1 The average time between date of change and date of 
disclosure is approximately five calendar days for all trades and does not differ 
according to firm size, assuming that on average directors do conform to their 
reporting requirements. Accordingly, for our sample, abnormal returns should not be 
evident starting five days after the date of the director’s change in holdings.  
 
Outsiders mimicking the trading patterns of directors can still earn significant 
abnormal returns up to 11.4% (sales trade) in the 160-day post-announcement period. 
In case of large companies it is as high as 16.4%.  For sales, in order to mimic the 
trade the outsider must already own shares in the company. Alternatively, this could 
be interpreted as a signal of when not to purchase shares. Short selling is not a viable 
strategy for mimicking directors’ sales, in that a short position must be settled within 
three days; however trades are only profitable over a relatively longer period of time. 
The finding that abnormal returns are predictable to some extent has important market 
efficiency implications and suggests that the market is not efficient in the semi-strong 
form; abnormal returns can be earned by trading on publicly available information at 
least in the case of small companies. 
5.2 Abnormal Volume 
As previously mentioned, abnormal volume provides further insight into the 
dissemination of directors’ trades into the market and the trading patterns of both 
directors and outsiders. If outsiders follow the disclosure of directors’ trades, it would 
be expected that volume would substantially increase on the day of disclosure. If this 
                                                 
1 Depending on the nature of non-disclosure the ASX will take appropriate action usually requiring the company or 
director to disclose the reason for the non-disclosure and the steps in place to ensure future compliance. If the listed 
entity continues not meeting the requirements of listing rule 3.19A, the ASX will refer the matter to ASIC for further 
action under s205G of the Corporations Act 2001 (ASX 2005). were the case, it would seem that outsiders do pay attention to the trading patterns of 
directors and they consider that directors’ trades convey a certain degree of 
information.  
The abnormal volume is displayed in Table 6 for the 160 days before and after the 
date of trade. Panel A of Table 5 indicates that abnormal volume for directors’ 
purchases on average increase substantially on the day before and the day after the 
date of trade. Panel B of Table 5 indicates that abnormal volume increases 
substantially on the day before the director’s sale through to the day after the trade. 
Apart from transactions by directors of large companies this is consistent when 
stratified according to company size, although reason for this finding is unclear.  
6. Average Abnormal Volume – All Trades 
  Table 5. Abnormal Volume        
     Breakdown by Company Size   
  Event Day  ALL Small  Medium  Large   
  Panel A.   Purchases        
 (-160)  -0.206  -0.273  -0.087  -0.388   
 (-90)  -0.212  -0.273  0.006  -0.369   
 (-20)  0.107  -0.182  0.340  0.252   
 (-5)  -0.144  0.154  -0.039  1.109   
 (-3)  0.014  -0.003  0.380  -0.254   
 (:0)  0.203  0.310  0.401  0.638   
 (+1)  4.98***  5.445***  4.026***  2.204*   
 (+3)  0.501  0.247  0.425  -0.070   
 (+5)  -0.152  -0.018  -0.126  -0.023   
 (+20)  -0.441  -0.444  -0.358  -0.270   
 (+60)  -0.119  -0.171  -0.046  -0.195   
 (+90)  -0.319  -0.302  -0.342  -0.412   
 (+160)  0.227  0.448  -0.053  1.380   
  Panel B.   Sales        
   ALL  Small  Medium  Large   
 (-160)  -0.228  0.205  -0.784  0.348   
 (-90)  -0.365  -0.980  0.342  -0.583   
 (-20)  0.011  -0.368  0.632  -0.548   
 (-5)  0.556  2.398*  -0.492  -0.225   
 (-3)  0.635  1.891  0.253  -0.399   
 (:0)  2.195**  5.917***  0.715  -0.231   
 (+1) 7.917***  3.957***  16.091***  -0.571   
 (+3)  -0.181  -0.595  0.075  -0.488   
 (+5)  1.489  2.550**  1.597  -0.561   
 (+20)  -0.466  -0.700  -0.024  -0.688   
 (+60)  -0.299  -0.679  -0.594  0.522   
 (+90)  -0.495  -1.035  -0.345  0.269   
 (+160)  -0.484  -0.843  -0.533  -0.498   
            
            
            
            * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% level. 
In the period before and after the trade date, apart from the substantial increase 
immediately surrounding the date of the trade, abnormal volume appears to fluctuate 
approximately around zero.
2 Again, this finding has a number of implications. 
Directors’ trades do not directly drive the substantial increase in volume. The volume 
starts to increase before the actual date of the director’s trade and on the day 
following the trade.  
 
Trading by informed outsiders may also explain the increase in volume prior to the 
trading by the director. The director may have expressed their intention to trade to 
other third parties who trade on this information before the director does and who do 
not have to report. Intuitively this does not make much sense. If a director were to 
inform others about their trading it would most likely be after the director has traded 
so as to maximise their own profits. On the other hand, it could be driven by other 
informed investors (may be near and dear of directors) who are privy to the non-
public information, other than leaks by the directors themselves, and who do not have 
to report their trades.  
An alternative explanation is that directors try to mask their trades by trading when 
the market is noisy and other uninformed investors are driving up volume. If private 
information becomes disseminated it loses its value to the informed agent. Therefore, 
in the process of trading, the informed strive to maintain privacy of their information, 
although this is only evident for purchase transactions.  
 
The finding that volume substantially increases on the day of trade for sales but not 
purchases indicates that directors are more likely to purchase shares in smaller 
denominations than sales in an attempt to hide their trading. It also supports the theory 
that informed traders transmit information by trading large amounts, a finding 
consistent with the previous observation that directors’ sales are more profitable than 
their purchases. 
Givoly and Palmon (1985) indicate that the mere occurrence of directors’ trades, 
regardless of whether it is based on inside information or not, may generate abnormal 
returns. Since many investors closely watch directors’ trades, their trading may trigger 
                                                 
2 The reasons for the apparent fluctuations on days –108, -28, +45 and +56 are unclear. a wave of transactions in the same direction by outsiders. This in itself may generate 
the abnormal returns to insiders in the period following their trades. Volume on the 
day of the trade and the following day substantially increases. Given that directors on 
average disclose their trade five calendar days after the date of the actual trade
3, this 
indicates that outsiders do not drive the abnormal volume in reaction to the trade 
because they are as yet unaware of the change in interest. 
 
The apparent under reaction by investors in response to directors’ trades could also be 
explained by the nature of the disclosure. (Daniel, Hirshleifer et al., 2002) note that in 
providing information to investors, relevant information must be salient and easily 
processed; the form as well as the content is important and affects how well the 
information is absorbed. Investors may find the disclosure of directors’ trades difficult 
to interpret. Not all trades are based on inside information and thus, investors must be 
able to discern the difference between trades in order to effectively mimic them 
promptly. This is especially likely to be the case in our study. Literature in Australia 
regarding effective trading strategies based on directors’ trades is scarce, as are 
commercialised services that explicitly sell and interpret insider trading data. 
Investors may not know which trades to mimic and even whether this presents a 
profitable strategy.  
 
It is also evident however, that volume significantly increases on the day of average 
disclosure for sales. This is noteworthy because it signifies that outsiders do pay 
attention to the trading of directors and mimic their trading. It appears however, that 
even though outsiders recognise that directors’ trades convey information, this is not 
fully incorporated into prices. 
 
5.3.1 Interest in Sales versus Purchases 
The observation that sales are generally more profitable than purchases is not new; 
however, the reason has previously never been explored. The studies by Brown & Foo 
(1997) & Givoly and Palmon (1985) observe this effect, however they do not provide 
an explanation extending beyond methodology limitations in the prior literature. The 
finding that purchases are more profitable than sales has an intuitive explanation. 
                                                 
3 See Gettler (2005) for contrary findings. Purchases are made for only one reason, to make a profit, whereas sales may be 
driven by other underlying factors such as taxation, diversification, liquidity etc. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory describes how individuals evaluate losses 
and gains in respect to a given reference point. They contend that losses create more 
distress among investors than the happiness created by equivalent gains. In regards to 
sales by directors, the loss aversion is not in relation to the foregone shares because 
they are traded as initially intended. Rather, the director is loss averse to the future 
loss of return that would occur if the director were to hold onto the shares. Given the 
same expected variation in returns, a director is more likely to trade based on negative 
information rather than equivalent positive information. 
 
Loss aversion can also explain the descriptive statistics whereby average trade size 
differs depending on the type of trade. Directors’ trades display more urgency when 
faced with the possibility of a real loss and therefore they will trade in larger amounts.  
It is also apparent that outsiders are loss averse, as evident from the abnormal volume 
displayed in Table 5. The substantial increase in volume on the day of disclosure for 
sales but not purchases indicates that outsiders are quick to update their beliefs in 
regards to potential losses, but they are slow to react to potential gains. 
  
6. Conclusions 
We examined the abnormal share price performance surrounding directors’ trades of 
intensive trading firms. Consistent with the majority of other studies we report that 
directors of small and medium companies on average outperform the market and seem 
to time their trades perfectly. Directors of these companies have an uncanny ability to 
time the market by trading when mispricing is greatest, and are able to predict the 
short term future performance of their firms because of their exclusive position. Sales 
consistently exhibit a price reversal effect; positive abnormal returns are earned prior 
to the sale and negative returns after it. The results indicate that the securities the 
directors were selling fell more than the general portfolio of similar sized companies. 
 
Directors’ trades are profitable over the longer term i.e. in the following 90 or 160 
days, rather than over a shorter horizon such as one month (20 days). Directors’ trades 
do contain information regarding the future predictability of the firms’ share price, especially in the case of directors of small companies. Outsiders recognise this and 
react to the disclosure of directors’ sales, however the price is slow to adjust; 
abnormal returns exist well after the disclosure of the trade. Outsiders are able to 
profitably mimic the trading of directors’ sales, and purchases made by directors of 
small companies.  
 
The finding that both directors beat the market and that outsiders can develop 
implemental trading strategies based on this information contradicts much of 
traditional finance and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Our results not only 
contradict the strong form of market efficiency in case of small companies but also 
the semi-strong form for most trades conducted in this study. We cannot discredit the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis completely. It is evident that outsiders do react to some 
information contained in directors’ trades, especially for sales. Because of the 
difficulty involved in interpreting the disclosure made by a director however, 
investors are unable to discern the supposed information contained in directors’ 
trades. Thus, the information is not immediately fully incorporated into prices, but is 
eventually. 
 
The policy implications of our findings are clear; directors do appear to disregard the 
law and the current regulatory environment doesn’t seem to deter them. ASIC may 
want to pay closer scrutiny to the trading activities of directors of small and medium 
companies and take further action if necessary. 
 
For future research, the most pressing need is to extend the sample size and the 
sample period. Thin trading is a problem affecting our sample which may introduces 
biases into the study. Like all other insider trading studies, our research does not 
provide any examination of instances of non-trading due to the possession of inside 
information. Nor does it provide evidence pertaining to trades by directors or other 
individuals privy to inside information, but which were not disclosed to the ASX.
4  
                                                 
4 Our study does include trades by immediate family members of directors, which were disclosed to the ASX. References 
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No. of shares Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
≤5 0 0 80101060
501-5,000 95 6 39 1 21 1 35 4
5,001-10,000 45 6 28 1 15 4 2 1
10,001-25,000 71 6 54 3 17 3 0 0
25,001-50,000 77 6 62 1 11 4 4 1
50,001-100,000 69 8 54 3 13 3 2 2
100,001-500,000 72 17 58 8 10 7 4 2
500,001-1,000,000 19 4 13 25111
1,000,001-5,000,000 15 7925411
>5,000,000 13010111
Total 472 63 318 22 98 28 56 13
All trades Small Medium Large
Table 2. Frequency Distribution for Number of Shares Traded by Directors
Breakdown by Company Size